[Paper] Robustness, Cost, and Attack-Surface Concentration in Phishing Detection

Published: (March 19, 2026 at 01:53 PM EDT)
2 min read
Source: arXiv

Source: arXiv - 2603.19204v1

Overview

Phishing detectors built on engineered website features attain near-perfect accuracy under i.i.d.\ evaluation, yet deployment security depends on robustness to post-deployment feature manipulation. We study this gap through a cost-aware evasion framework that models discrete, monotone feature edits under explicit attacker budgets. Three diagnostics are introduced: minimal evasion cost (MEC), the evasion survival rate $S(B)$, and the robustness concentration index (RCI). On the UCI Phishing Websites benchmark (11,055 instances, 30 ternary features), Logistic Regression, Random Forests, Gradient Boosted Trees, and XGBoost all achieve $\mathrm{AUC}\ge 0.979$ under static evaluation. Under budgeted sanitization-style evasion, robustness converges across architectures: the median MEC equals 2 with full features, and over 80% of successful minimal-cost evasions concentrate on three low-cost surface features. Feature restriction improves robustness only when it removes all dominant low-cost transitions. Under strict cost schedules, infrastructure-leaning feature sets exhibit 17-19% infeasible mass for ensemble models, while the median MEC among evadable instances remains unchanged. We formalize this convergence: if a positive fraction of correctly detected phishing instances admit evasion through a single feature transition of minimal cost $c_{\min}$, no classifier can raise the corresponding MEC quantile above $c_{\min}$ without modifying the feature representation or cost model. Adversarial robustness in phishing detection is governed by feature economics rather than model complexity.

Key Contributions

This paper presents research in the following areas:

  • cs.LG

Methodology

Please refer to the full paper for detailed methodology.

Practical Implications

This research contributes to the advancement of cs.LG.

Authors

  • Julian Allagan
  • Mohamed Elbakary
  • Zohreh Safari
  • Weizheng Gao
  • Gabrielle Morgan
  • Essence Morgan
  • Vladimir Deriglazov

Paper Information

  • arXiv ID: 2603.19204v1
  • Categories: cs.LG
  • Published: March 19, 2026
  • PDF: Download PDF
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