[Paper] LNTest: A Testbed for Evaluating Bitcoin Lightning Network-Based Botnets

Published: (June 11, 2026 at 12:29 AM EDT)
2 min read
Source: arXiv

Source: arXiv - 2606.12887v1

Overview

Bitcoin’s Lightning Network (LN) can be exploited as a covert, low-cost command-and-control (C&C) channel for botnets, as demonstrated by the LNBot and D-LNBot designs. However, both remain proof-of-concept prototypes evaluated only through simulation, leaving key questions about real-world topology formation, propagation complexity, and resilience to takedowns unanswered. We present LNTest, the first reusable testbed for LN-based botnets, built from Core Lightning nodes containerized with Docker over a shared Bitcoin Core regtest chain. LNTest supports three overlay topology modes (a deterministic chain, autonomous peer discovery, and user-supplied graphs), enabling controlled experiments across different botnet structures. Using LNTest, we report three main findings. First, D-LNBot’s autonomous formation protocol does not produce the uniform chain from its design; instead, it creates a clustered chain in which cliques are linked by bridge nodes whose removal fragments the network. Second, command propagation scales linearly with botnet size ($Θ(n)$), not the $O(m \log n)$ previously claimed, and gains nothing from higher neighbor connectivity. Third, the overlay topology determines the effectiveness of takedown strategies: uniform-degree chains resist targeted removal but fragment under random failure, scale-free topologies show the opposite pattern, and the autonomous clustered chain is fragile under both, making it the most vulnerable of the three. LNTest is released as open source, with a script that reproduces all our experiments, to support reproducible research on LN-based botnet defenses.

Key Contributions

This paper presents research in the following areas:

  • cs.CR
  • cs.DC
  • cs.NI

Methodology

Please refer to the full paper for detailed methodology.

Practical Implications

This research contributes to the advancement of cs.CR.

Authors

  • Thomas Bakaysa
  • Ahmet Kurt
  • Abdul-Salem Beibitkhan
  • Jesus Maria Romo Diaz de Leon
  • Tag Kalat
  • Joshua Kramer
  • Estela Rodriguez
  • Abraham Watkins
  • Abdullah Aydeger

Paper Information

  • arXiv ID: 2606.12887v1
  • Categories: cs.CR, cs.DC, cs.NI
  • Published: June 11, 2026
  • PDF: Download PDF
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