[Paper] Bitcoin After Block Rewards
Source: arXiv - 2606.05503v1
Overview
Bitcoin’s block reward is scheduled to decline to zero, raising concerns about whether the network can remain secure once miners rely solely on transaction fees. This paper seeks to identify the conditions under which large-scale and persistent deviation from honest mining can arise. We analyze and compare the payoffs of honest and deviating miners in a sequential decision model, and identify a deviation threshold $G_t$ at which honest mining ceases to be privately optimal. Around the 2024 Bitcoin halving, we show that current mining behavior does not exhibit large-scale or structural deviation. However, when the block reward is removed, the $G_t$ criterion implies that deviation can arise even with a very small fraction of transaction fees. Finally, we evaluate three protocol-level mechanisms: Base Fee, Fee Floor, and an adaptive maximum block size rule, and show that their combination raises the deviation threshold and mitigates incentive breakdown in a fee-only regime. These results provide a practical benchmark for assessing Bitcoin’s security as block rewards disappear.
Key Contributions
This paper presents research in the following areas:
- cs.CR
- cs.DC
- cs.GT
Methodology
Please refer to the full paper for detailed methodology.
Practical Implications
This research contributes to the advancement of cs.CR.
Authors
- Junhyuk Lee
Paper Information
- arXiv ID: 2606.05503v1
- Categories: cs.CR, cs.DC, cs.GT
- Published: June 3, 2026
- PDF: Download PDF