[Paper] A Proof of Success and Reward Distribution Protocol for Multi-bridge Architecture in Cross-chain Communication

Source: arXiv - 2512.10667v1

Overview

The paper introduces Proof of Success and Reward Distribution (PSCRD), a protocol that coordinates multiple blockchain bridges and fairly splits the fees they earn. By moving from a single‑bridge model to a multi‑bridge architecture, PSCRD aims to cut down centralization, eliminate single‑point‑of‑failure risks, and keep user costs roughly unchanged.

Key Contributions

• Multi‑bridge coordination protocol that orchestrates cross‑chain message delivery across several independent bridges.
• Fair reward‑sharing mechanism based on a provable “proof‑of‑success” that allocates transfer fees proportionally to each bridge’s contribution.
• Incentive alignment that encourages honest participation and long‑term commitment from bridge operators.
• Quantitative fairness & decentralization metrics (Gini index and Nakamoto coefficient) showing progressive improvement as more bridges join.
• Simulation framework that validates PSCRD’s performance under realistic network conditions and adversarial scenarios.

Methodology

1. System Model – The authors model a cross‑chain transaction as a request that must be relayed by a group of bridges. Each bridge independently validates the request and returns a signed “success proof.”
2. Proof‑of‑Success Generation – A bridge produces a cryptographic proof (e.g., a Merkle‑style receipt) once it has safely locked the source assets and prepared the destination mint. The proof is broadcast to the other bridges in the group.
3. Consensus on Success – The protocol defines a threshold (e.g., k out of n bridges) that must present valid proofs before the transaction is considered final. This threshold can be tuned for security vs. latency.
4. Reward Distribution Algorithm – After consensus, the total fee paid by the user is split among the k successful bridges. The split is computed using a weighted function that accounts for each bridge’s historical reliability and latency, ensuring that more trustworthy bridges earn slightly more while still keeping the distribution equitable.
5. Evaluation – The authors run Monte‑Carlo simulations with varying numbers of bridges, network delays, and adversarial bridge behavior. They track two key indicators:
   • Gini Index – measures how evenly fees are distributed across bridges.
   • Nakamoto Coefficient – estimates how many bridges must collude to control the system, reflecting decentralization.

Results & Findings

• Fairness improves dramatically as more bridges join; the Gini index drops from a highly skewed distribution to near‑uniform.
• Decentralization rises: the Nakamoto coefficient shows that an attacker would need to compromise 4–7 bridges to subvert the system, compared with a single point of failure in the baseline.
• Cost impact is minimal: the extra fee overhead stays under half a percent, well within typical user tolerance.
• Robustness to malicious bridges: simulations where up to 30 % of bridges behave adversarially still maintain consensus and fair reward distribution.

Practical Implications

• For Bridge Operators – PSCRD offers a clear revenue model that scales with participation, encouraging smaller or newer bridges to join without fearing fee cannibalization.
• For DApp Developers – Integrating a multi‑bridge SDK that implements PSCRD can provide higher reliability for cross‑chain token swaps, NFTs, or DeFi actions, reducing downtime caused by a single bridge outage.
• For Wallets & End‑Users – The protocol keeps fees low while delivering better fault tolerance; users benefit from smoother cross‑chain experiences without needing to manually select a bridge.
• For Blockchain Ecosystems – Adoption of PSCRD could raise the overall Nakamoto coefficient of the cross‑chain layer, making the whole ecosystem more resistant to coordinated attacks or censorship.
• Potential for Standardization – The proof‑of‑success format and reward‑splitting logic could become part of an emerging cross‑chain communication standard (e.g., IBC‑style extensions), fostering interoperability across heterogeneous chains.

Limitations & Future Work

• Latency Trade‑off – Adding more bridges slightly increases transaction finality time; future research could explore adaptive thresholds that balance speed and security dynamically.
• Economic Modeling – The current reward function is heuristic; a game‑theoretic analysis could refine incentives to further deter collusion or Sybil attacks.
• Real‑World Deployment – Simulations assume ideal network conditions; field trials on live testnets would reveal practical challenges such as bridge onboarding, key management, and regulator‑related compliance.
• Bridge Heterogeneity – The protocol treats bridges as homogeneous participants; extending PSCRD to account for differing security guarantees (e.g., proof‑of‑stake vs. proof‑of‑authority bridges) is an open avenue.

Overall, PSCRD provides a promising blueprint for building a more decentralized, fair, and resilient cross‑chain bridge ecosystem—an essential step as blockchain applications continue to span multiple networks.

Authors

• Damilare Peter Oyinloye
• Mohd Sameen Chishti
• Jingyue Li

Paper Information

• arXiv ID: 2512.10667v1
• Categories: cs.CR, cs.DC, cs.ET
• Published: December 11, 2025
• PDF: Download PDF