[Paper] Towards Online Malware Detection using Process Resource Utilization Metrics

Published: (January 15, 2026 at 03:05 AM EST)
3 min read
Source: arXiv

Source: arXiv - 2601.10164v1

Overview

The paper presents an online learning framework for detecting malware in real time by monitoring a process’s resource‑usage metrics (CPU, memory, I/O, etc.). Instead of training a static model on a massive, pre‑labeled dataset, the authors continuously update the classifier as new execution data arrives, enabling it to spot zero‑day threats and adapt to the ever‑changing malware landscape.

Key Contributions

  • Online learning pipeline that ingests live process‑level resource utilization data and updates the detection model incrementally.
  • Feature set based solely on OS‑level metrics, avoiding heavyweight instrumentation or sandboxing.
  • Empirical comparison with traditional batch‑trained classifiers, showing superior detection of unseen (zero‑day) malware and robustness when training data is scarce.
  • Demonstration of low‑overhead deployment suitable for cloud VMs, containers, and edge/IoT devices.

Methodology

  1. Data Collection – While a program runs, the system records lightweight metrics (CPU % per core, resident memory, disk reads/writes, network I/O, context switches, etc.) at regular intervals (e.g., every second).
  2. Feature Engineering – Raw time‑series are summarized into statistical descriptors (mean, variance, min/max, entropy) and short‑term trends, producing a fixed‑length vector per process.
  3. Online Learning Algorithm – The authors use adaptive algorithms such as Hoeffding Adaptive Trees and Online Gradient Boosting, which can ingest one sample at a time and adjust their decision boundaries without retraining from scratch.
  4. Label Propagation – When a process is later confirmed (by a security analyst or an offline scanner) as benign or malicious, its feature vector is fed back to the model as a labeled instance, triggering an incremental update.
  5. Evaluation Setup – Two experimental scenarios are considered:
    • Zero‑day detection: the model is trained on older malware families and tested on brand‑new samples.
    • Limited data: only a few labeled instances are available for training, mimicking early‑stage outbreak conditions.

Results & Findings

ScenarioBatch Model (e.g., Random Forest)Online Model (Hoeffding Tree)
Zero‑day detection (F1‑score)0.620.78
Limited data (10 samples)0.480.71
Average CPU overhead per process~3 %~1.5 %
Memory footprint150 MB≈ 45 MB
  • The online approach outperforms static batch models by 15–30 % in F1‑score for unseen malware.
  • It remains effective with as few as 10 labeled examples, whereas batch models degrade sharply.
  • Resource consumption stays well within the limits for production servers and edge devices, confirming the practicality of the metric‑only feature set.

Practical Implications

  • Real‑time protection for cloud tenants – Cloud providers can embed the detector in hypervisors or container runtimes to flag suspicious processes before they compromise other workloads.
  • Edge/IoT security – Low‑power devices can run the lightweight monitor without needing full sandbox environments, enabling early detection of malicious firmware updates or compromised services.
  • Continuous security posture – Security operations teams can feed analyst‑verified labels back into the system, turning every investigation into a model‑improvement step—essentially a “self‑learning” IDS.
  • Reduced reliance on signature updates – Since the model learns from behavior, it can catch novel ransomware, cryptominers, or file‑less attacks that evade traditional AV signatures.

Limitations & Future Work

  • Feature scope – Relying only on resource metrics may miss stealthy malware that mimics benign usage patterns; combining with system call or network flow data could improve coverage.
  • Label latency – The online model updates only after a process is labeled, which may introduce a delay in adapting to fast‑spreading threats. Exploring semi‑supervised or unsupervised drift detection is a next step.
  • Evaluation breadth – Experiments were conducted on a curated dataset of Windows executables; extending to Linux, Android, and heterogeneous IoT firmware would validate cross‑platform robustness.

Bottom line: By shifting from static, batch‑trained classifiers to an incremental, behavior‑driven detection engine, this research offers a scalable path for developers and security teams to stay ahead of rapidly evolving malware—especially in cloud and edge environments where speed and resource efficiency are paramount.

Authors

  • Themistoklis Diamantopoulos
  • Dimosthenis Natsos
  • Andreas L. Symeonidis

Paper Information

  • arXiv ID: 2601.10164v1
  • Categories: cs.SE
  • Published: January 15, 2026
  • PDF: Download PDF
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