The Projector Botnet: How a Simple Home Device Was Exploited for Ads, Data, and Bandwidth

Source: Dev.to

How the Investigation Started

I run AdGuard Home on my local network to monitor and filter DNS requests from all connected devices. One evening, while checking the query log to troubleshoot slow network activity, I noticed something unusual.

• My projector (identified as 192.168.100.3 – “Projector Android”) was making hundreds of DNS requests every hour.
• The requests were not to typical streaming services but to:
  • pornographic websites
  • adult ad networks
  • shady tracking domains
  • click‑fraud infrastructure
  • foreign servers unrelated to any installed apps

Every single request originated from the projector, even when it was idle.

A Pattern of Automated Porn and Ad Traffic

The logs showed constant attempts to access domains such as:

• jizzbunker.com
• porntire.com
• yescams.com
• discretxxx.com
• hotmoza.tv
• bbs.airav.cc
• Various .xxx, .cc, .tv adult networks

Characteristics of this traffic

• Automated and repetitive
• Occurring at all hours
• Unrelated to any user activity

AdGuard’s parental‑control filter blocked these domains, but the underlying behavior was alarming. This was not accidental browsing or a user mis‑click; it appeared to be a background process built into the projector’s firmware, calling home to ad networks and content providers without consent.

What This Means: Adware at the Firmware Level

Cheap Android projectors often run heavily modified versions of Android that include:

• Preinstalled “free movie” or “TV” apps
• Hidden ad SDKs
• Forced web traffic to generate advertising impressions
• Data‑harvesting services
• Remote command‑and‑control channels

In my case, the projector was:

1. Generating ad calls to porn sites to create revenue for unknown third parties.
2. Contacting ad and tracking networks likely embedded in preinstalled apps.
3. Initiating background traffic even when unused, consuming bandwidth.
4. Potentially exposing the local network to outside access through questionable services.

When a device sends automated porn traffic in the background, it is not a “bug” – it is monetization through hidden adware installed at the factory level.

Why This Is Dangerous

1. Bandwidth theft – The device silently consumes your internet connection for unsolicited activities.
2. Exposure to unsafe networks – Malicious domains may download additional payloads or link to command servers.
3. Privacy invasion – Your network activity becomes intertwined with adult traffic you never generated.
4. Vulnerability to remote access – Some cheap Android devices include backdoors that allow external control.
5. Potential legal implications – Unfiltered traffic may appear as intentional access to illegal websites.

How to Verify If Your Smart Devices Are Affected

If you own an Android‑based projector, TV box, or budget streaming device, you can test it yourself:

1. Install a DNS‑filtering solution such as AdGuard Home, Pi‑hole, or similar.
2. Let it run for a few hours with the device connected.
3. Check the query log for unusual patterns:
   • porn sites
   • ad networks
   • foreign domains
   • unknown tracking services
4. Reboot the device and observe whether traffic resumes immediately.
5. Perform a factory reset and check if the behavior persists.
6. Remove or disable suspicious preinstalled apps.
7. If possible, isolate the device on a separate VLAN or guest network.

If the logs continue after a reset, the behavior is likely baked into the firmware.

What Manufacturers Don’t Tell You

Ultra‑cheap Android projectors and TV boxes often come from factories that subsidize hardware costs by preinstalling:

• Adware
• Click‑fraud bots
• Tracking frameworks
• Third‑party revenue‑generating services

This practice explains why some devices are significantly cheaper than branded alternatives, but it also puts your network, data, and bandwidth at risk.

What Consumers Should Do

Until stricter regulations force transparency in IoT devices, consumers can protect themselves by:

• Avoiding no‑brand Android projectors and TV boxes.
• Using DNS filtering (AdGuard Home, Pi‑hole, etc.).
• Isolating IoT devices on separate networks.
• Monitoring traffic regularly.
• Favoring reputable manufacturers with audited firmware.

Your projector should never secretly browse adult sites on its own.

Conclusion

This investigation revealed a disturbing truth hiding in plain sight: a smart device inside my home was not just projecting movies—it was participating in an underground ecosystem of ad fraud, bandwidth abuse, and unsolicited adult traffic. If this can happen in a projector, it can happen in any smart device. Consumers deserve transparency, and until that changes, awareness is our strongest defense.