Why Cloudflare is Right to Stand Against Italy's Piracy Shield
Source: Dev.to
Understanding the Piracy Shield System
Italy’s Piracy Shield platform, launched in February 2024, was designed to combat illegal streaming of live sports events—particularly Serie A football matches. The system requires internet service providers, VPN providers, and DNS resolvers to block access to reported domains and IP addresses within 30 minutes of notification.
On paper this sounds reasonable. In practice, it’s a technical and procedural nightmare that fundamentally misunderstands how the internet works.
The Numbers Tell a Story
Since its launch, Piracy Shield has blocked:
- 65,000+ domain names
- ≈ 14,000 IP addresses
But a significant portion of these blocks have caused collateral damage to legitimate services.
The Technical Reality: Why DNS‑Level Blocking Is Problematic
Shared Infrastructure Creates Collateral Damage
The internet relies heavily on shared infrastructure. Multiple websites often share the same IP address through:
- Content Delivery Networks (CDNs)
- Shared‑hosting environments
- Virtual‑hosting configurations
- Cloud platforms
When Piracy Shield blocks an IP address, it doesn’t just block the pirate site—it can block dozens or even hundreds of legitimate services that happen to share that infrastructure.
Research from the University of Twente found that Piracy Shield had inadvertently blocked hundreds of legitimate websites, including:
- Google Drive (blocked for several hours in October 2024)
- YouTube (same incident)
- Educational websites
- Charitable organizations
- Small‑business sites
- Payment platforms
The Scale of Cloudflare’s Operations
Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 DNS resolver handles approximately 200 billion queries daily. It’s used by millions of people worldwide who value privacy, speed, and reliability.
Implementing Italy‑specific filtering on this global infrastructure would:
- Increase latency for all users globally, not just in Italy
- Require constant monitoring and updates to blocklists
- Create a precedent for every country to demand similar filtering
- Transform a neutral infrastructure service into a content moderator
IP‑Address Recycling
Hosting providers frequently recycle IP addresses, assigning them to new customers once freed. Under Piracy Shield’s automated system:
- An IP used by a pirate site today might be assigned to a legitimate business tomorrow
- There’s no clear mechanism for how long blocks should remain active
- The 24‑hour “unblocking window” is insufficient for identifying and resolving false positives
The Procedural Nightmare
No Judicial Oversight
The system operates as an automated platform where copyright holders (called flaggers) can report domains and IPs directly to AGCOM, which then orders blocks within 30 minutes. There is:
- No judicial review before blocking
- No requirement to prove infringement
- No meaningful appeal process
- Complete lack of transparency about what gets blocked and why
The 30‑Minute Rule Is Unrealistic
Requiring ISPs and DNS providers to implement blocks within 30 minutes assumes:
- All reports are accurate (they’re not)
- The internet operates with clear boundaries (it doesn’t)
- Collateral damage is acceptable (it isn’t)
- Technical implementation is trivial (it’s not)
This timeline makes it impossible to verify claims, assess collateral damage, or implement blocks carefully.
Lack of Transparency
For months the list of blocked resources was completely secret. AGCOM denied FOIA requests repeatedly. Only through leaked data on GitHub could researchers verify the scope and accuracy of the blocks.
This opacity makes it impossible for:
- Website owners to know if they’re affected
- Users to understand why they can’t access services
- Technical operators to plan around blocks
- Civil society to hold the system accountable
The European Commission’s Concerns
In June 2025, the EU Commission sent a letter to Italy’s Minister of Foreign Affairs expressing serious concerns that Piracy Shield may violate:
- The Digital Services Act (DSA) – particularly Article 8, which requires procedural safeguards when legal content is restricted
- The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – specifically the rights to freedom of expression and information
Even Italy’s own AGCOM Commissioner Elisa Giomi publicly distanced herself from the system, stating that AGCOM “risks unintentionally limiting freedom of expression” and engages in censorship.
Why This Matters for Developers
It Sets a Dangerous Precedent
If Italy succeeds in forcing Cloudflare to implement country‑specific DNS filtering, other countries will follow. We’ll end up with:
- A fragmented internet infrastructure
- Higher latency globally
- Increased operational complexity
- The “Splinternet” – a web divided by national borders
It Misunderstands DNS
DNS is meant to be a neutral translation service—it converts domain names to IP addresses. It’s not designed to be a content‑moderation tool. Using DNS as a censorship layer undermines its core purpose and opens the door to widespread abuse.
Conclusion
Cloudflare’s refusal to comply with Italy’s Piracy Shield is not an act of defiance for profit’s sake; it’s a defense of an open, interoperable, and technically sound internet. By standing up to overreaching, technically flawed, and procedurally opaque censorship, Cloudflare protects:
- The integrity of global DNS infrastructure
- The rights of developers and users worldwide
- The principle that content moderation should happen above the network layer, with proper judicial oversight
The battle in Italy is a bellwether for the future of the internet. Let’s ensure the outcome preserves the open web we all rely on.
Undermines Internet Architecture
- Creates single points of failure
- Makes the internet less resilient
- Breaks the principle of end‑to‑end communication
It Doesn’t Even Work
Research shows that determined pirates simply:
- Migrate to new domains
- Switch to IPv6 addresses
- Use different hosting providers
- Employ VPNs and encrypted DNS
Meanwhile, legitimate services suffer the consequences of over‑blocking.
It Threatens Smaller Services
Cloudflare provides free cybersecurity services to millions of small websites. If forced to withdraw from Italy or implement filtering, these services would be most affected:
- Small businesses couldn’t afford enterprise alternatives
- Independent creators would lose DDoS protection
- Educational resources would become vulnerable
- The democratization of web infrastructure would suffer
The Better Alternative
- Judicial review before blocking – ensure claims are verified before action
- Target the actual infringers – use legal mechanisms against operators, not infrastructure
- Improve content distribution – make legal content more accessible and affordable
- Implement safeguards – require proof that IPs are exclusively used for infringement
- Transparency and accountability – public blocklists with appeal mechanisms
- Reasonable timelines – allow time for verification and careful implementation
Cloudflare’s Response
CEO Matthew Prince has been vocal in opposing this system, calling it:
- A scheme to “censor the Internet”
- Operated by “a shadowy cabal of European media elites”
- Lacking “judicial oversight, due process, appeal, or transparency”
Prince has indicated that if the fine stands, Cloudflare may:
- Discontinue free cybersecurity services for Italy‑based users
- Remove all Cloudflare servers from Italy
- Terminate plans to build an Italian office
These aren’t idle threats—they’re the logical consequence of a regulatory environment that makes it impossible to operate while maintaining service integrity.
Conclusion: Standing for an Open Internet
The Cloudflare vs. Italy dispute is about more than copyright enforcement. It’s about whether we’ll have a global, open internet or a fractured, censored one where every country can demand infrastructure providers become content police.
Cloudflare is right to resist because:
- Technical feasibility – DNS‑level blocking at global scale is technically harmful and creates unacceptable collateral damage.
- Procedural fairness – No system should block content without judicial review and proper safeguards.
- Proportionality – A fine exceeding double the revenue earned from an entire country is punitive, not corrective.
- Precedent – Acquiescing would invite similar demands from every jurisdiction worldwide.
- Internet architecture – DNS should remain neutral infrastructure, not a content‑moderation layer.
As developers, we build on the foundation of open protocols and neutral infrastructure. When regulators try to break that foundation in pursuit of short‑term goals, we must stand against it—not because we support piracy, but because we understand that the cure is worse than the disease.
The fight against piracy is legitimate, but it must be waged in ways that respect internet architecture, due process, and the rights of legitimate users and services. Italy’s Piracy Shield fails on all counts.
Cloudflare’s resistance isn’t about protecting pirates—it’s about protecting the internet itself.
What are your thoughts on this issue? How should we balance copyright enforcement with internet freedom? Share your perspective in the comments below.