Why CAPTCHAs today are so bad (and what we should be building instead)
Source: Dev.to
The Problem with Modern CAPTCHAs
Modern CAPTCHAs are meant to stop bots, but in reality they mostly punish humans. Clicking traffic lights, rotating images, or solving puzzles breaks UX, accessibility, and flow — while advanced bots often pass anyway.
Flawed Assumptions
The core problem isn’t the implementation; it’s the assumption that users are either “human” or “bot.” Real behavior is probabilistic. Timing, cadence, input entropy, device consistency, and trajectories over time exist in shades of gray, not absolutes.
Most CAPTCHA systems hide this uncertainty. Yet every security decision already depends on configuration: thresholds, confidence levels, and tolerance for risk. Two companies can run the same detection logic and behave completely differently — and that’s not a bug, it’s policy.
An Experimental Alternative
I’ve been working on an experimental project called **, an invisible behavioral security system that doesn’t pretend to be perfect. Instead of blocking users aggressively, it applies progressive enforcement based on configurable risk tolerance. Detection admits uncertainty, UX degrades gradually, and behavior improves over time.
I’m currently exploring white‑label use cases and real‑world feedback.
Get In Touch
If this idea interests you or you want to discuss behavioral security:
- Discord: pixelhollow