npm audit Won't Save You: Why We moved to TEEs (Trusted Execution Environments)
Source: Dev.to
As developers, we are obsessed with code quality. We run linters, we do static analysis, and we patch dependencies. But in the world of digital asset custody, perfect code running on compromised hardware is still a vulnerability.
The Problem with Standard Linux Instances
If your private‑key management service runs on a standard Linux instance, you are at the mercy of the OS kernel. A rootkit, a zero‑day in the hypervisor, or a rogue admin with sudo access can dump memory and extract the keys. Encryption at rest means nothing if the key must be decrypted in RAM to sign a transaction.
The Shift to Enclaves
This is why we are enforcing the use of TEEs (Trusted Execution Environments), such as Intel SGX or AWS Nitro Enclaves. A TEE acts as a “black box” within the CPU, isolating the signing logic and key shards from the rest of the system. Even the operating system cannot peek inside, and even a security advisor cannot SSH in and read the memory.
Implementation Details
Isolation
The signing service runs inside the enclave.
Attestation
Before the enclave receives a key shard, it must cryptographically prove (Remote Attestation) that it is running the correct, unadulterated binary.
Ephemeral Execution
The key is reconstructed (via MPC), signs the transaction, and vanishes—all within the encrypted memory space of the CPU.
We need to stop building financial apps like they are social networks. The stakes are different. If you are building custody solutions, move the trust anchor from the admin to the silicon.
